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Being in time : dynamical m...
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood -- indeed, can only be understood -- as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, throu
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monografia Rebiun33880890 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun33880890 m o d cr cnu---unuuu 120702s2012 ne ob 001 0 eng d 2012016358 798795618 817096164 960200016 961681678 962611200 988418716 991927886 994988295 1037710958 1038672113 1038683199 1045527315 1062897526 1066430137 1081235420 1153048394 1259124564 9789027273598 electronic bk.) 9027273596 electronic bk.) 1280879521 9781280879524 9789027213549 9027213542 9786613720832 6613720836 DEBBG BV043130819 DEBBG BV044166710 DEBSZ 397333544 DEBSZ 42996255X NZ1 16078441 EBLCP eng pn EBLCP OCLCO IDEBK N$T E7B YDXCP CDX COO OCLCQ OCLCF DEBSZ OCLCQ LOA OCLCQ AGLDB MOR PIFAG ZCU OTZ OCLCQ MERUC OCLCQ U3W UUM STF WRM VTS ICG INT NRAMU VT2 OCLCQ WYU UWO U3G DKC AU@ OCLCQ M8D UKAHL OCLCQ AJS OCLCO OCLCQ UKCRE QGK OCLCO PSY 008000 bisacsh SCI 090000 bisacsh JMR bicssc Being in time dynamical models of phenomenal experience edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach Amsterdam Philadelphia John Benjamins Pub. Co. 2012 Amsterdam Philadelphia Amsterdam Philadelphia John Benjamins Pub. Co. 1 online resource 1 online resource Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Advances in consciousness research 88 Includes bibliographical references and index Being in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary AcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction -- special laws:; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood -- indeed, can only be understood -- as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, throu English Phenomenological psychology Experience- Psychological aspects Consciousness Time Consciousness Time Psychologie phénoménologique Expérience- Aspect psychologique Conscience Temps time PSYCHOLOGY- Cognitive Psychology SCIENCE- Cognitive Science Consciousness Experience- Psychological aspects Phenomenological psychology Time Edelman, Shimon Fekete, Tomer Zach, Neta Print version Being in time. Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub. Co., 2012 9789027213549 (DLC) 2012016358 (OCoLC)793226702 Advances in consciousness research v. 88