



Acerca de los conceptos de individuos en tanto individuos y del concepto de yo como uno de ellos [

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text (article)

Analítica

Beginning in modernity, philosophy relied on the absolute certainty of self-reference and the I am to establish a new ontology dividing the totality of being in, on one hand, the one being that is aware of itself, and out of this is completely certain of both its existence and what it is, and, on the other hand, the rest of beings that the I is aware of, the knowledge of which beings is mediated by representations. To this day this way of thinking maintains its strong influence on philosophy. However, an ontological analysis of the concepts of individuals as individuals, the concept of I being one of them, emphasizing that this concepts are based on being in the sense that an entity is, different in meaning from being in the sense of what that entity is which grounds the concepts of what things are, may lead to a radical critique of the foundational reasoning of modernity by showing that the distinction between the I and its alterity is only the numerical difference between coexisting entities on which all concepts of individuals regarded only as individuals are based and not an ontical difference between two classes of entities

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