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cover The admissible contents of ...
The admissible contents of experience
Wiley-Blackwell 2011

Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content

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Título:
The admissible contents of experience [ electronic resource] / edited by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson
Editorial:
Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011
Descripción física:
1 online resource (200 p. ) : ill
Nota general:
Originally published as Volume 59, Issue 236 of the Philosophical Quarterly
Bibliografía:
Includes bibliographical references and index
Contenido:
Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). 3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London). 5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noe, University of California, Berkeley). 6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin). 7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford). 8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University). 9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University of Texas at Austin). Index
ISBN:
1-283-27415-9
1-4443-4388-2
9786613274151
1-4443-4391-2
1-4443-4389-0
Materia:
Autores:
Enlace a formato físico adicional:
1-4443-3335-6

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