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Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content
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monografia Rebiun25092318 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun25092318 m o d | cr|||||||||||| 110203s2011 enka ob 001 0 eng d 2011001480 1-283-27415-9 1-4443-4388-2 9786613274151 1-4443-4391-2 1-4443-4389-0 CBUC 991010730018306709 CBUC 991010730018306709 MiAaPQ MiAaPQ MiAaPQ HPL HPK 128.4 22 The admissible contents of experience electronic resource] edited by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson Chichester, West Sussex Malden, MA Wiley-Blackwell 2011 Chichester, West Sussex Malden, MA Chichester, West Sussex Malden, MA Wiley-Blackwell 1 online resource (200 p. ) ill 1 online resource (200 p. ) Originally published as Volume 59, Issue 236 of the Philosophical Quarterly Includes bibliographical references and index Introduction (Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). 3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London). 5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noe, University of California, Berkeley). 6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin). 7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford). 8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University). 9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University of Texas at Austin). Index Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noe (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine's College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience Published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background knowledge and beliefs, as well as experience. This raises the question of how are we able to determine what the admissible contents of experience are, whether they include singular or existential contents, and whether they include contents pertaining to causation or natural kinds. The papers in this collection address these issues, together with questions concerning the nature of perceptual content. They deal with the central issues of whether perceptual content is similar to the content of the propositional attitudes; whether all states with content fall neatly into the categories of either belief or experience. The book also focuses on whether there exists a continuum from states that are more like perceptual experiences to states that are more like belief, and, indeed, ultimately whether we should consider perceptual experiences to have content at all. This ground-breaking volume is published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterl y. Electronic reproduction. Askews and Holts. Mode of access: World Wide Web Experience Perception Evidence Belief and doubt Electronic books Hawley, Katherine Dr Macpherson, Fiona 1-4443-3335-6