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Dynamic Games and Applicati...
This volume contains eleven articles which deal with different aspects of dynaoic and differential game theory and its applications in economic modeling and decision making. All but one of these were presented as invited papers in special sessions I organized at the 7th Annual Conference on Economic Dynamics and Control in London, England, during the period June 26-28, 1985. The first article, which comprises Chapter 1, provides a general introduction to the topic of dynamic and differential game theory, discusses various noncooperative equilibrium solution concepts, includ- ing Nash, Stackelberg, and Consistent Conjectural Variations equilibria, and a number of issues such as feedback and time-consistency. The second chapter deals with the role of information in Nash equilibria and the role of leadership in Stackelberg problems. A special type of a Stackelberg problem is the one in which one dominant player (leader) acquires dynamic information involving the actions of the others (followers), and constructs policies (so-called incentives) which enforce a certain type of behavior on the followers; Chapter 3 deals with such a class of problems and presents some new theoretical results on the existence of affine incentive policies. The topic of Chapter 4 is the computation of equilibria in discounted stochastic dynamic games. Here, for problems with finite state and decision spaces, existing algorithms are reviewed, with a comparative study of their speeds of convergence, and a new algorithm for the computation of nonzero-sum game equilibria is presented
Monografía
monografia Rebiun25354769 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun25354769 m o d cr mnu---uuaaa 121227s1986 gw o 000 0 eng 934989591 936313576 9783642616365 electronic bk.) 3642616364 electronic bk.) 9783540164357 3540164359 10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5 doi AU@ 000051700219 NZ1 15000307 NZ1 15619000 AU@ eng pn AU@ OCLCO OCLCQ GW5XE OCLCF UA@ COO OCLCQ EBLCP OCLCQ YDX UAB OCLCQ AU@ LEAUB OCLCQ KCA bicssc BUS069030 bisacsh 330.1 23 Baar, Tamer Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics edited by Tamer Baar Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1986 Berlin, Heidelberg Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1 online resource (ix, 288 pages) 1 online resource (ix, 288 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 0075-8442 265 1. A Tutorial on Dynamic and Differential Games -- 2. On Expectations, Information and Dynamic Game Equilibria -- 3. On Affine Incentives for Dynamic Decision Problems -- 4. On the Computation of Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Dynamic Games -- 5. Some Economic Applications of Dynamic Stackelberg Games -- 6. Applications of Dynamic Game Theory to Macroeconomics -- 7. Optimal Strategic Monetary Policies in Dynamic Interdependent Economies -- 8. Optimal Dynamic Pricing in an Oligopolistic Market: A Survey -- 9. Dynamic Advertising and Pricing in an Oligopoly: A Nash Equilibrium Approach -- 10. Game Theory Models of Fisheries Management -- A Survey -- 11. Common-Property Exploitations under Risks of Resource Extinctions This volume contains eleven articles which deal with different aspects of dynaoic and differential game theory and its applications in economic modeling and decision making. All but one of these were presented as invited papers in special sessions I organized at the 7th Annual Conference on Economic Dynamics and Control in London, England, during the period June 26-28, 1985. The first article, which comprises Chapter 1, provides a general introduction to the topic of dynamic and differential game theory, discusses various noncooperative equilibrium solution concepts, includ- ing Nash, Stackelberg, and Consistent Conjectural Variations equilibria, and a number of issues such as feedback and time-consistency. The second chapter deals with the role of information in Nash equilibria and the role of leadership in Stackelberg problems. A special type of a Stackelberg problem is the one in which one dominant player (leader) acquires dynamic information involving the actions of the others (followers), and constructs policies (so-called incentives) which enforce a certain type of behavior on the followers; Chapter 3 deals with such a class of problems and presents some new theoretical results on the existence of affine incentive policies. The topic of Chapter 4 is the computation of equilibria in discounted stochastic dynamic games. Here, for problems with finite state and decision spaces, existing algorithms are reviewed, with a comparative study of their speeds of convergence, and a new algorithm for the computation of nonzero-sum game equilibria is presented Economics Economics. Electronic books Print version 9783540164357 Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems 265