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After Saddam : prewar plann...
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations
Monografía
monografia Rebiun33842092 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun33842092 m o d cr cnu---unuuu 090522s2008 cauab ob 000 0 eng d 233177558 319212631 519487932 609334618 646798442 656470910 712982079 733947624 855308527 907536754 991961915 1008955074 1044496593 1060862412 1066560397 1070189413 1115113716 1143430581 1401754598 9780833046383 electronic bk.) 0833046381 electronic bk.) 9780833044587 0833044583 9781282033238 online) 1282033239 9786612033230 AU@ 000051314521 AU@ 000069750911 CDX 9833393 DEBBG BV043104941 DEBSZ 422014109 GBVCP 1008652687 GBVCP 802850227 RAND/MG-642-A 203323 MIL N$T eng pn N$T OCLCQ IDEBK OCLCQ TUU OCLCQ OCLCO SNM ZCU UBY CLU CDX E7B AZU CNCGM OCLCQ OCLCA JSTOR OCLCE OCLCF ZBL XBM TEFOD NLGGC OCLCO OCL BWS YDXCP OCLCQ TEFOD UAT S3O OCL OCLCQ AGLDB CUS PIFAG OCLCQ LND VT2 OCLCO WY@ LOA LUE ICG OCLCA U3W VTS CEF JBG ERL WYU OCLCQ OCLCO UWO STF M8D OCL UNA UKAHL OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ UEJ dlr a-iq--- n-us--- HIS 027170 bisacsh TEC025000 bisacsh POL037000 bisacsh POL035000 bisacsh After Saddam prewar planning and the occupation of Iraq Nora Bensahel [and others] Santa Monica, CA Rand Arroyo Center 2008 Santa Monica, CA Santa Monica, CA Rand Arroyo Center 1 online resource (xxxvii, 273 pages) illustrations, maps 1 online resource (xxxvii, 273 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF Rand Corporation monograph series "Prepared for the United States Army." "MG-642-A"--Page 4 of cover Includes bibliographical references (pages 255-273) Military planning efforts -- Civilian planning efforts -- Task Force IV -- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance -- Humanitarian planning -- Combat operations during Phase IV -- The Coalition Provisional Authority -- Building new Iraqi security forces -- Governance and political reconstruction -- Economic policy -- Essential services and infrastructure -- Assessing postwar efforts This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations Coalition Provisional Authority Coalition Provisional Authority. Iraq War, 2003-2011 Military planning- United States Postwar reconstruction- Irak Insurgency- Irak National security- Irak Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 Planification militaire- États-Unis Reconstruction d'après-guerre- Irak Révoltes- Irak HISTORY- Military. TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING- Military Science. Insurgency. Military planning. National security. Postwar reconstruction. peacebuilding- Irak Irak Estados Unidos Estados Unidos- military strategy. EBooks (www) Bensahel, Nora 1971-) Estados Unidos. Army Books at JSTOR: Open Access JSTOR Books at JSTOR: Open Access Print version After Saddam. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 9780833044587 0833044583 (DLC) 2008025846 (OCoLC)232002125 Rand Corporation monograph series